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In this paper, we analyze the relationship between interest rates on government bonds (GB) and 
fiscal consolidation rule by using an overlapping generation model with endogenous and stochastic 
growth settings. 
Our key findings are summarized as follows. First, interest rates of GB may be declining as 
public debt accumulates relative to private capital, as opposed to the conventional view that buildup 
of public debt accompanies a rise in interest rates. Second, fiscal consolidation rule plays a key role 
in determining interest rates in equilibrium. Third, the economy may exhibit discrete changes with 
interest rates diverging, implying that our observation of relatively low GB interest rates does not 
assure the continuation of that trend in the future. Fourth, a preventive tax increase to contain public 
debt at sustainable levels will not gain the political support of existing generations, whose life span 
is limited. Citizens prefer to shift the ultimate burden of public debt to future generations. 
 
JEL classification: E17; H30; H5; H60; E62; H63 
Keywords: Overlapping generation model; interest rate on government bond; fiscal consolidation 
rule; default risk 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Public debt as a percentage of GDP has recently been increasing in developed countries. The gross 
public debt-to-GDP ratio of Japan is especially high compared to that of other developed countries in 
2011. The International Monetary Fund (2009) has estimated that Japan’s gross public debt would 
reach 277% of GDP by 2016. In such circumstances, interest rates on government bonds (GB) would 
theoretically rise as a reflection of default risk, as shown by Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009). 
Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2006), and Akitobi and Stratmann (2008) have also found the 
existence of spreads that may be interpreted as risk premiums. 
 
On the other hand, interest rates of Japanese Government Bond (JGB) has been lower than that of 
other developed countries. In addition, we can observe that the interest rates of JGB are currently 
declining, even though Japanese public debt continues to increase (See Figure 1). A relevant model 
and mechanism are required to illustrate the seemingly paradoxical confluence of trends. The 
following possibilities are considered as facets of the mechanism: (1) the reflection of default risk 
for JGB is weak because 95% of JGBs are held by domestic investors; (2) domestic investors may 
believe that the Japanese Government will not default on its debt obligations because there are 
several fiscal reform opportunities (e.g., consumption tax increases) that could help maintain fiscal 
sustainability; and (3) domestic and foreign investors believe that the interest rate on JGB is low 
because economic growth under the country’s aging and declining population is expected to be low 
as well. 
 
Despite these possible motivations, the mechanism for the current interest rate decline remains 
unclear, and there is no model to explain it. One complication is that GB interest rates also depend 
on fiscal policy. In particular, fiscal consolidation rule (e.g., tax increases, expenditure cuts, and 
defaulting on bonds) is important, as governments cannot always roll over public debt to future 
administrations and generations. Gale and Orszag (2002) and Laubach (2009) have pointed out that 
the response of GB interest rates on to fiscal policy depends on expectations about the future course 
of fiscal policy. Perotti (2007) and Favero and Giavazzi (2007) also have found evidence of a change 
in the relation of macro variables to fiscal policy. This change has been interpreted as evidence of a 
change in reactions of fiscal policy to stabilization of debt-to-GDP. Uribe (2006) and Juessen et al. 
(2009) have analyzed government default risk and its reflection on GB interest rates by using a 
quantitative macroeconomic model. However, Uribe (2006) focuses on external debt with open 
economy. In the case of external debt, defaulting is considered a deliberate strategic decision of the 
government that reflects the outcome of an optimization problem (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, 
or Arellano, 2008). Although Juessen et al. (2009) focus on internal debt using a model with closed 
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 economy, these theoretical studies never provide examine the potential effects of fiscal consolidation 
rule on interest rates. Therefore, we provide a macroeconomic model to explain the importance of 
fiscal consolidation rule; this model clarifies the relationship between decreasing GB interest rates 
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In this paper, we consider overlapping generation models with endogenous and stochastic growth 
settings. The production technology contains spillover associated with private capital and 
productivity shock. Each generation comprises the representative household that lives for two 
periods. We account for demographic changes in the economy. Population growth is assumed to be 
known, but can vary over time. In the young period, the household supplies labor in an elastic 
manner. Taxes are levied on wages. Part of after-tax wage income is saved. We suppose that there are 
two types of assets that are tax free. One is private capital and another is GB. The former yields 
uncertain returns due to the productivity shock of the subsequent period. The latter promises a fixed 
return, but also a risk of default. As opposed to Juessen, et a (2009)., we consider that default may be 
partial. In the old period, the household is retired and receives returns on private capital and GBs.   
 
Key findings of this paper are summarized as follows: Interest rate of GB may be declining as public 
debt is accumulated relative to private capital, so the former crowding out the latter as opposed to 
conventional view that built up of public debt accompanies rise of interest rate. The prospect of 
future tax increases due to as the fiscal consolidation rule serves to lower expected return on private 
capital, which in turn decreases interest rates charged on GB through arbitrage. We establish that 
fiscal consolidation rule plays a key role in determining equilibrium interest rates. In addition, the 
economy may exhibit discrete changes and diverging interest rates, implying that the declining GB 
interest rate trend may not continue as public debt further accumulates. We also show that preventive 
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 tax increases to contain public debt will not gain the political support of existing generations, whose 
life span is limited. Instead, citizens prefer to shift the ultimate burden of public debt to future 
generations who cannot currently vote. This confirms the argument that public debt is exploitive of 
future generations. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. In section 3, we 
consider fiscal consolidation rule and establish equilibrium GB interest rates. Section 4 uses the 
equilibrium in analysis of comparative statics. We clarify our theoretical argument by simulation in 
section 5. Section 6 discusses the implications of the results, and Section 7 concludes.   
 
 
2.  Model Setting   
 
2.1 Basic setting   
 
In this paper, we employ a stochastic overlapping generation model. Each generation contains a 
representative household that lives for two periods. In each period, a single good is produced by 
labor and capital, but the production is stochastic due to technology shock. 
 
Each period is divided into several stages. At Stage 1, production shock is revealed. The household 
of the young generation supplies labor at Stage 2. Then output realizes at Stage 3, with wages being 
paid to the young and return on capital being distributed to the old. The government collects taxes 
and repays public debt at Stage 4. At Stage 5, the young and the old households consume the former, 
also saving and choosing a portfolio. Public debt and private capital are carried over to the next 
period.  
 
To clarify, our analysis follows the two steps. First, we establish intra-period or static equilibrium 
given public debt and capital carried over from the previous period. We then turn to dynamics. The 




t Y  denotes aggregate output at period t that is produced by the representative private firm. The 
production function of the economy is given as 
(1)   
α α μ ε
− =
1 ) ( t t t t t t l n k AK Y
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 where A (>0) is constant, μ > 0 and 0 < α < 1.  t ε  denotes productivity shock. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that the shock is distributed according to the distribution function  ) ( t F ε  
over the interval  ] , [ ε ε   with  1 = t t E ε .    represents private capital that is invested in the previous 
period, and    represents labor supply per worker at period t. Population of generation t is denoted 
by  (t = 1, 2,……). Then   represents total labor supply.    refers to average capital 
investment and represents the external effect of capital accumulation. Following the literature on 
endogenous growth, it may be interpreted as knowledge spillover that serves as a pure public, 
generating an economy of scale (Romer (1986) ). In the equilibrium, we have  . 
t k
t l
t n t t t l n L = t K
t t K k =
 
Suppose that production is perfectly competitive. The price of output being normalized to unity, we 
can write the wage and return on capital as 
(2)  t t t L Y w / ) 1 ( α − = ;  t t t k Y r / α =  
As is standard in the literature, market transaction fails to account for the spillover effect in 
determining the return on capital.   
   
2.3 The household problem 
 



















where θ > 0 and δ > 0.   denotes the young period of consumption, whereas   is the older 
period. The second term in the first bracket is the disutility of labor supply. It enters in the utility 
function so that labor supply responds to after-tax wage, abstracting income effect. This 
simplification follows the literature on optimal income taxation. For instance, see REF. The first 






The household of generation t supplies labor only after   becomes known. However, it is 
confronted with risks of both productivity shock and government default when making saving 
decisions. Eq. (3) implies that its preference is neutral to these risks. Given the Cobb Douglas form 
of the utility function, however, inter-temporal elasticity of substitution turns to be unity. One may 
find it odd that risk and time preferences are separately defined; our specification deviates from the 
standard setting that assumes that lifetime utility is additive over periods and over different states of 
the economy. Inter-temporal elasticity is not tied to the inverse of risk aversion in the present context. 
Admittedly ad hoc, Eq. (3) helps isolate the household’s portfolio choice between private capital and 





Household budget constraints at the young and the old periods are given by 
    (4.1)    t t t t t t
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where  t τ  is wage income tax,  t ω  is after tax wages,   is the GB’s (one plus) interest rate, and 
 represents the share of the GB in total savings. 
t R
1 + t t q ζ  represents the default rate as a value 
between zero and unity. The variables with tilde address unknown quantities when saving at period t. 
  is determined at period t with default risk  t R 1 + t δ ; net return on GB is not certain.
1  
 
In the young period, the household decides labor supply   and saving   and chooses portfolio 
  to maximize returns:   
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This is subject to Eq. (4), where the expectation is calculated over  1 + t ζ  and  . The household’s 
optimization yields the following: 
1 + t r
(5.1)   
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By (5.1), wage elasticity of labor is constant at δ. Wage taxation becomes distortive as elasticity 
increases. Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification, savings is a fixed share of the wage income net of 
the labor disutility , with income effect and substitution effect offsetting one another as given in 
(5.2). Finally, (5.3) gives the arbitrage condition between private capital and the GB. Given that the 
household is risk-neutral, arbitrage leads to the equation of expected return of both assets, which 
should be intuitive.   
t Ψ
 
2.4 Market Equilibrium   
 
This subsection considers market equilibrium given fiscal policy. At every period, both labor and 
capital markets are cleared. Given  t ε  and  , the equilibrium values of wage and return on private 
capital at period t are determined by substituting (5.1) into (2) such that   
t k
                                                  
1  In (4.2), we abstract idiosyncratic risk, including bankruptcy of private capital. This presumes that the household 
can fully diversify such risk and that only aggregate shock will remain.   
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The output at period t becomes 
(7)     ()
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Consider the external effect: in the equilibrium, we have  t t k K = , the capital investment in market 
being exactly equal to the average in the economy. In addition, we set the parameter associated with 











Note that  α μ − =1
 
if δ = 0 or if labor supply is completely inelastic, as assumed by Romer (1986). 
Then, (7) turns to be   
(7’)    () t t t t t k n A Y
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 )( 1 (
αδ α αδ δ αδ δ αδ α δ ε τ α
+ − + + + + + − − − =
The above is familiar in the endogenous growth model, which yields constant growth rates as a 
function of policy parameters. The wage rate is linear with respect to    as well, whereas return on 
private capital turns out to be independent of  :  
t k
t k
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Lastly, we turn to the capital market. Because of the closed economy, household savings must meet 
demand of private firms and the government.   denotes GBs issued at period t and repaid at t + 
1.
1 + t b
2 Given that total savings at period t is   as allocated between   and  , the equilibrium 
condition is expressed by   
t ts n 1 + t k 1 + t b
(8) 
*
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Manipulating the above establishes the dynamics of private capital accumulation as the following: 
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As opposed to the growth model with agents of infinite life, the OLG may exhibit dynamic 
inefficiency, in which growth rate becomes lower than interest rate. The following lemma yields the 
condition that the economy remains dynamically efficient:   
                                                  
2  We consider only a single period bond, and thus we abstract issues of bond maturity composition.   
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Proof of this is shown in Appendix A. Throughout the paper, we assume that the above inequality 
holds.  
 
2.5 Government budget   
 
The government raises revenue by issuing GB and taxing wage income. It then spends this on debt 
repayment and public expenditure, the latter being denoted by  .    is assumed to not contribute 
to production (1) or directly enter into household utility (3). This assumption is motivated to simplify 
our analysis, but may be plausible when government spending comprises political rents or pork 
diverted to special interest groups. The funding flow of the government budget at period t is written 
as 
t G t G
(10) 
 
} { 1 t t t t t G T b R b − − = +
 
t t t t t t Y L w T where  τ α τ ) 1 ( − = =
  and    is given in (7’). For the latter, the following lemma 
establishes the revenue-maximizing tax rate that determines the upper bounds for tax rates in the 
case of fiscal consolidation: 
t Y
 











At this point, we distinguish fiscal rule between pre-fiscal consolidation and fiscal consolidation 
regimes. This is denoted by  , which contains tax rate , government expenditure 
ratio 
} , , { t t t t ζ λ τ ≡ Ω t τ
t λ , and default rate  , and may be state-contingent for consolidation regimes. Fiscal rules 
are assumed to be public information, implying that these rules are incorporated in the pricing of GB, 
as discussed below. The present model does not suppose optimization behavior of the government in 
the pursuit of social welfare. We instead take the pragmatic view that government policy is largely 
politically constrained, as opposed to being designed based on economic rationale.   
t ζ
 
Let  , with  } , , {
0 ζ λ τ ≡ Ω 0 = ζ . In the pre-consolidation regime, the government taxes wage income 




t ε ; that is,  1 = t ε  and  , such that  τ τ = t t t Y G λ = , where   
(11)  () t t t k n A Y
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t G   remains proportional to  t Y , defined above in the consolidation regime and illustrated later. With 
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 (11) and (12), the primary surplus at period t is defined by 
(12)    () ) , , ( ) 1 (
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 (
t t t t t t n A k G T PS ε λ τ α
αδ α αδ δ Δ − = − =









− − ≡ Δ
+ − + + + − ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
) 1 ( ) , , (
αδ α δ αδ δ αδ α δ τ
α
λ
ε τ τ ε λ τ
t
t t t t t t  
Substituting (12) into (10) and manipulating it establishes the dynamics of public debt over multiple 
periods we arrive at 
(13)  () ) , , ( ) 1 (
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where    is as given in (8’).    t t k k / 1 +
 
Note that in the present economy,    and    serve as state variables that are determined at 
period t and carried over to period t + 1. They then affect the risk of fiscal consolidation at t + 1 as 
discussed in the next section. 
1 1/ + + t t k b 1 + t k
 
 
3.  Equilibrium  
 
3.1 Fiscal sustainability 
 
The fiscal rule  in the pre-consolidation regime does not assure that public debt remains 
at fiscally sustainable levels. Tax rates may be too low and/or expenditure ratio may be too high to 
structurally generate primary deficit; that is, 
} , , {
0 ζ λ τ ≡ Ω
0 ) , , ( < Δ t ε λ τ
 
for most of  t ε . The public debt may 
reached a level at which the status quo fiscal rule cannot be sustained. We do not suppose that the 
government undertakes precautionary measures to prevent such circumstances. Political economy 
considerations on such measure will be discussed later.   
 
Given the OLG setting, a capital market may not work to discipline government financing, because 
the finite-life household may not be concerned with long run fiscal sustainability. Unless it is certain 
that  1 + t ζ =1 with risk-neutral preference and that (5.3) holds, a household will purchase GB, with the 
default risk perceived as being compensated by a higher ex ante promised interest rate.   
 
In the present context, therefore, the government can access credit insofar as the GB level does not 
exceed domestic savings with the interest rate fulfilling (5.3). Suppose, however, that the economy 
reaches  , that is, the domestic savings at period t + 1 is fully absorbed by government 
borrowing, given that the economy is closed and no private investment can take place, which implies 
1 1 2 + + + = t t t s n b
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 that there is no production in the subsequent period, or  0 2 = + t Y  for all  2 + t ε . Once this occurs, the 
government can find no resource for repayment. It then has to default on the debt so that  2 + t ζ =1 is 
certain, and therefore, there will be no return on GB.
3 This in turn implies that the households cease 
to lend to the government. The government is then forced to undertake fiscal consolidation without 
further borrowing. This entails tax increases, expenditure cuts, and further defaulting on GB. 
 
Lemma 3: Full default is inevitable at period t + 1 irrespective of  2 + t ε  when  .   1 1 2 + + + = t t t s n b
 
With   or  , we have  1 1 2 + + + = t t t s n b 0 2 = + t k ∞ = + + 2 2 / t t k b at period t+1. The literature of fiscal 
sustainability discusses the transversality condition of the present value of the public debt in the 
infinite future. Indeed, Juessen et al. (2009), using infinitely living agents, considers that the 
government is forced to default on its debt once the condition fails to hold. In the OLG setting, 
however, the household is willing to purchase GB in its young period, when debt repayment occurs 
in the next period or the consolidation risk is compensated with a higher GB interest rate. To state it 
differently, the transversality condition does not define government default in the present model. See 
Appendix B.   
 
3.2 The threshold   
 
Inserting  ∞ = + + 2 2 / t t k b
1 + t
  into (13) and manipulating it yields the following condition of the threshold 
level of  ε , below which regime change occurs: 
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This defines the threshold  1 ˆ + t ε  implicitly as the function of the interest rate charged on  , as 
well as debt-to-capital ratio and demography:  where  .
1 + t b
) 1 + ) , 1 1 + + t t Z R ( ˆ ˆ 1 1 + + = t t ε ε , / ( 1 1 + + = t t t n k b 1 + t Z
4 With 
  and  ,  1 + t R 1 1/ + + t t k b 1 ˆ + t ε
 
increases such that fiscal consolidation is more likely to be in place, 
whereas it is lowered with  .  1 + t n
 
Lemma 4: Fiscal consolidation must occur at period t + 1 when  1 1 ˆ + + ≤ t t ε ε  
 
Fiscal consolidation involves tax increases, expenditure cuts, and defaulting on GB. The state of the 
economy at period t+1 is denoted by  ) , 1 t t n + / , ( 1 1 1 t t t k b + + + = Ξ ε . The fiscal rule is then expressed as 
, with  , which contains   
) ( 1 1 + + Ξ Ω ≡ Ω t t 0 2 = + t b
                                                  
3  On the other hand, return on private capital remains positive, with the revenue maximizing tax rate being bounded 
by less than 100%. 
4 We  let  ε ε = +1 ˆt   when the LHS exceeds the RHS at  ε ε = +1 ˆt . Note that the fact that consolidation is inevitable 
with  ε ε = +1 ˆt   does not mean full default, that is, 1 1 = + t ξ , given that    remains at a finite level.  1 1/ + + t t k b
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 τ τ τ τ ≤ Ξ = ≤ + + ) ( 1 1 t t , ) ( 1 1 + + Ξ = ≥ t t λ λ λ  
1 ) ( 0 1 1 ≤ Ξ = ≤ + + t t ζ ζ   
where the default rate fulfills
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The government cannot fully meet its obligation but repays its outstanding debt as much as possible 
out of the primary surplus, as illustrated in (15). Under the consolidation rule, either tax rate, 
expenditure ratio, or default rate deviates from the initial levels. The fiscal rule can take a general 
form, but may be plausibly levied according to the following restrictions: 
(Assumption2)  
0 ) / ( ) ( 1 1 1 ≥ ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b i τ  
0 ) / ( ) ( 1 1 1 ≥ ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b ii ζ  
0 ) / ( ) ( 1 1 1 ≤ ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b iii λ  
In the simulation of section 5, we specify fiscal consolidation rule. Note that it takes only one period 
to restructure government finance. Given that no GB is issued, the economy will return to the initial 
regime in the next period without debt liability being carried over.   
 
3.3  Interest  rate  
 
Let us turn to GB interest rate  , which is settled at period t, accounting for fiscal consolidation 
in the event of  . Recall the arbitrage condition (5.3), which equates return on GB and 
capital in the expected term. Manipulating it with the use of (6.2) and (15) establishes the following:   
1 + t R
1 1 ˆ + + ≤ t t ε ε
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and   of    means the vector of    1 + t τ ) , ˆ ( 1 1 + + Φ t t τ ε 1 + t τ
 
Note that   reflects the expected return on private capital. ) , ˆ ( 1 1 + + Φ t t τ ε
6 We can clearly see that it is 
non-increasing with the threshold level, given that  1 + ≤ t τ τ . This represents the perverse effect of 
wage tax increases under fiscal consolidation that discourage labor supply and in turn lower the 
productivity of private capital.   
 
                                                  
5  The consolidation rule can be interpreted in a reduced form that incorporates the dependency of the equilibrium 
values of    and  1 + t R 1 ˆ + t ε   on  .   ) , / ( 1 1 1 t t t t n k b Z + + + =
6  ) , ˆ ( )) 1 ( ( ) (
1
1 1
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 (
1 1 + +
+ + + −
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−
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α
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 (16) yields the GB interest rate as a function of the threshold, the debt-to-capital ratio, and the 
population:  ) , ˆ ( 1 1 1 1 + + + + = t t t t Z R R ε . The effect of  1 ˆ + t ε   is described in the following lemma:   
 
Lemma 5:   
Denoting  ) , ˆ ( = Z ˆ 1 1 1 1 + + + + t t t t ε τ τ and   where ) Z , ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
1 1 1 1 + + + + = t t t t ε ζ ζ ) , / ( 1 1 1 t t t t n k b Z + + + = , we have   
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The proof is shown in Appendix C. This lemma implies that the interest rate is increasing (resp. 
decreasing) in    when fiscal consolidation entails no tax increase (resp. no default) and thus 
revenue loss is made up for by defaulting on outstanding debt (resp. by raising tax) at the threshold 
level. It may be counterintuitive that    may be lowered as    increases. To see the point, note 
that in the present model, fiscal consolidation involves both the default and the tax increase. The 
former adds the risk premium of GB relative to private capital, thereby raising its interest rate. The 
latter, on the other hand, reduces the return on private capital, which works to lower the GB interest 
rate through arbitrage. We then have the case of 
1 ˆ + t ε
0 < ∂ ∂ + + t t R ε  when tax increases dominate the 
default risk. 
 
Consider the increase of  .    is increasing with it, since the productivity of private capital is 
enhanced as labor supply is enhanced. On the other hand, the impact of the debt-to-capital ratio is 
ambiguous as well.  , directly appearing in (16), serves to raise  , whereas by 
Assumption 2, the induced tax increase under consolidation works in the opposite direction. That is, 
1 + t n 1 + t R
1 1 / + + t t b k 1 + t R
0 ) / ( 1 1 1 ≥ ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b τ .  
 
To clarify our analysis, it will be of help to consider extreme consolidation rules as follows:   
 
No Tax Increase: Let τ τ = Ξ + ) ( 1 t 1 + t   for all ε , such that there is no need for a tax increase. 
Consolidation entails defaulting on outstanding debt as well as cutting government expenses. The 
default rate fulfills 
(15’)  () ) ), ( , ( ) )) ( 1 ( 1 1
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1 (
1 /( ) +αδ δ  
  represents such fiscal consolidation. According to Lemma 5, the function of 
1 ˆ + t ε ) , ˆ ( 1 1 + + t t Z ε   should be upward with respect to  .  
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 No Default: Suppose instead that no default is allowed, or  0 1 = + t ζ  for  all  , but the outstanding 
debt must be fully repaid through tax increases and expenditure cuts, with 
1 + t ε
) ( 1 1 + + Ξ = t t τ τ  being 
implicitly determined by (15) with ) ( 1 1 + + Ξ = t t ζ ζ   = 0. Let  denote fiscal rule. Then, 
(16) reduces to 
) ( 1 + Ξt
ND
1 + Ω = Ω
ND
t
() ) 1 + t , ˆ (
1
) 1 ( 1
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 (
1 +
+ + + −
+ Φ
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αδ δ αδ α
1 ˆ + t
1 + = t R τ (16’)   
which is decreasing with  ε .
7   is also decreasing in the debt-to-capital ratio, given that the 
RHS of (16) decreases as 
1 + t R
 is  raised.
8    ) ( 1 1 + + Ξ = t t τ τ
 
3.4  Interaction 
 
There exists interaction between the threshold of the fiscal consolidation  1 ˆ + t ε   and the GB interest 
rate  , defined by (14) and (16) respectively. Solving these equations yields their equilibrium 
values. Note that these are assessed from period t or ex ante perspective when    is not known 
and fiscal consolidation is not yet in place. 
1 + t R
) ( 1 1 + + Ξ Ω = Ω t t
1 + t ε
*
1 + t R
*
1 ˆ + t ε
1 1 / + + t t k
 
Proposition 1: Denote by   and   the equilibrium levels of the GB interest rate and the 
threshold of fiscal consolidation conditional upon b   and the consolidation rule 
. These are given as solutions to the following equations:   
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In the above proposition, we do not preclude the case that there arise multiple equilibria, with the 
two equations intersecting more than twice or with the equilibrium diverging, that is,   reaching 
*
1 ˆ + t ε
 as  illustrated  below.   ε
 
Corollary to Proposition 1: 
 
                                                  
7  The sufficient condition for    to exist is given by:  ) ( 1 1 + + Ξ Ω = Ω t
ND ND
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8  One may note that government financing can be regarded as sustainable in the present context even for  1 1 ˆ + + ≤ t t ε ε
without default. We interpret fiscal sustainability in a slightly strict way, in that it refers to a circumstance in which 
status quo fiscal policy including taxation and expenditure can be sustained.   
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 In the corner equilibrium with  ε ε = +
*
1 ˆt , we can define the GB interest rate 
*
1 + t R  if there exists a 
consolidation rule that fulfills
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with no default at   so  that   ε ε = +1 t
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(
10 and    are the solution to  1 + t R
(  
) , ( ˆ 1 1 1 + + + = t t t Z R
(
ε ε . 
 
 
In the corollary, the default rate is set to zero at  ε ε = +1 t . The consolidation rule at the corner 
equilibrium may differ from the one applied to the interior one. The presumption is that the 
representative household forecasts  1 + Ωt  when  it  anticipates ε ε = +
*
1 ˆt . Also note that  1
*
1 + + > t t R R
(
  is to 
assure that (14) yields  ε ε = +1 ˆt , taking as given 
*
1 + t R




4.  Comparative Statics 
 
4.1 Debt accumulation   
 
Regarding comparative statics, totally differentiating the equation (14) of threshold
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Meanwhile, we focus on the interior and stable equilibrium where the equilibrium interest rate is 
finite, with ε ε   > 0. Then we obtain the following proposition in the 
case of no demographic change.   
 
                                                  
9  The sufficient (and strict) condition for such fiscal rule to be feasible is:   
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Given that the LHS is declining with the wage tax rate. 
 
10  This inequality is re-written as: 
































) 1 )( 1 (
) (
1
) 1 /( ) 1 (
) 1 /( ) 1 (
) 1 /( ) 1 (
 
14 
 Proposition 2: The debt-to-capital ratio 
(i)      is increasing if 
*
1 ˆ + t ε 0 ) / ( / 1 1 1 ≥ ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b R
0 / 1 1 >
 
(ii)      is increasing if  and 
*
1 + t R ∂ ∂ + + t t R 0 ) / ( / 1 1 1 ≥ ε ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b R
0 / 1 1
 
(iii)      is decreasing if  and 
*
1 + t R < ∂ ∂ + + t t R 0 ) / ( / 1 1 1 ε ∂ ∂ ≤ + + + t t t k b R
0 / 1 1 > ∂ ∂ + + t t R ε
0 / ( / 1 1 ∂ ∂ + + t t b R
( ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 + + + = t t t R
 
 
Figure 2 depicts possible scenarios. Figure 2(a) gives the case of  and
. The initial equilibrium is located at point A. Increasing the debt-to-capital 
ratio moves  ) , 1 + t Z
) 1 ≥ + t k
 rightward  an ) 1 + d  , ˆ ( 1 1 1 + + + = t Z t t t R R ε ε ε upward. The intersection of the 
two functions is then shifted up and right such that both the interest rate and the threshold are raised. 
In Figure 2(b) ) 1 + ,  1 + t R , ˆ ( 1 1 + + = t t t Z R ε  is sloped downward. The initial equilibrium is again given by 
point A.  ) , 1 1 + + t t Z ( ˆ ˆ 1 1 + + = t t R ε ε  moves in the same way as Figure 2(a), with  . Suppose 
. The threshold is raised, moving the new equilibrium to point B. The change in 
interest rate is not certain. Let 
1 1/ + + t t k b
0 ) / ( / 1 1 1 > ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b R
0 ) 1 / ( / 1 1 ≤ ∂ ∂ t R +
*
1 + t R + + t t k b .   is then lowered to point C, whereas 
change in   is  ambiguous. 
*
1 ˆ + t ε
 
            F i g u r e   2 ( a )                      F i g u r e   2 ( b )  
1 ˆ + t ε 1 ˆ + t ε
1 + t R
1 + t R
0 0
) , ˆ ( 1 1 1 + + + t t t Z R ε
) , ˆ ( 1 1 1 + + + t t t Z R ε
) , ( ˆ 1 1 1 + + + t t t Z R ε






1 + t R
*
1 ˆ + t ε *
1 ˆ + t ε
*
1 + t R
 
The upshot is that we have the circumstance that   decreases with debt being accumulating 
relative to private capital as depicted in Figure 2(b). This is likely when fiscal consolidation rule 
includes large tax increases while keeping the default rate low at most of 
*
1 + t R
1 + t ε , such as 




 significant in the fiscal rule.)   
 
It is often addressed that as consequence of crowding out private investment, the buildup of public 
debt leads to surges in interest rates. The presumption of such an argument is diminishing marginal 
returns on investment. Decreased private capital then enhances its productivity on margin, which in 
turn raises market interest rate. The endogenous growth setting, however, does not translate the 
crowding out into such increases of the marginal product of  , as it is fixed depending upon the 
wage tax rate and other economic environment. Rather, expectation of future tax increases reduces 
the expected return on private capital, which is in turn reflected in lower levels of  . To state it 
differently, lower   signals a cautionary view of future government financing in the present 
context. 
1 + t k
1 + t R
1 + t R
*
1 + t R
*
t R
1 1 / + + t t k b
0 / 1 1 > ∂ ∂ + + t t R ε ) ( 1 + Ξ Ω t
0 ) / ( / 1 1 1 ≥ ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b R ) , ˆ ( 1 1 1 + + + t t t Z R ε
3 2 ) / ( k b <
1 ) / ( k b
1 + t k
         
 
At this point, it is worth addressing that consolidation rule plays a key role in determining 
equilibrium. If consolidation is done mostly by defaulting the public debt as   in  the 
extreme, the case of Figure 2(a) becomes likely, raising    as the public finance deteriorates. The 
contrasting trend shown in Figure 2(b) is observed when consolidation includes a significant tax 
increase while respecting the debt obligation. It can be perceivable that   is lower in the latter 
fiscal rule than the former, given  . The different fiscal rules are compared in the simulation 
as well.   






4.2 Discrete Change 
 
In Figure 2, we assume a unique and interior solution to equations (14) and (16). However, we may 
have multiple or corner equilibria. Figure 3 illustrates such to be the case, assuming 
given the consolidation rule  applied to the interior equilibrium. Also, 
suppose  such that the curve of   moves upward along with 
the debt-to-capital ratio.   
 
The figure depicts three different levels of the ratio with  . At  , the 
GB interest rate and the threshold functions intersect only once at point A that yields unique 
equilibrium. For the middle level of the ratio, the two functions turn to cross twice at points B and C. 
Point B gives stable equilibrium, whereas C is unstable. In the case of multiple equilibria, outcome 
depends upon belief of the household who purchases GB.
1 ) / ( ) / ( k b k b <
11 Note that further increasing    1 / + t b
                                          
11  In a more general context in which households of one generation are heterogeneous, some coordination of beliefs 
is needed to determine which equilibrium is achieved. 
16 
 shifts the two curves so that points B and C come too close. They touch one another at D in the case 
of  , beyond which the interior solution disappears. This implies that the economy moving 
along the stable interior equilibrium may exhibit a discrete change to the corner solution with higher 
interest rates and threshold. Thus, the observation that GB interest rate has remained relatively low 





1 ˆ + t ε
1 + t R
0
D
1 ) / ( k b
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*
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C
( ) • = + + + , ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 t t t R ε ε
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1 ) / ( k b
2 ) / ( k b
2 ) / ( k b
3 ) / ( k b
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In the figures, we address the circumstances in which the buildup of public debt might lead to lower 
GB interest rates owing to the prospect of future tax increases relating to fiscal consolidation, and in 
which there might thus be a sudden rise of interest rates from relatively stable and low rates to 
extreme levels, thus increasing the fiscal consolidation risk. We confirm these scenarios by 
simulation in section 5.   
 
 
4.3 Demographic Impact 
 
Lastly, we examine the effects of demographic change. Note that in the endogenous growth model, 
the population or labor force is a key driving force to enhance productivity. With population size 
lowered, productivity decreases and thus the expected return on capital is diminished, which in turn 
works to reduce  . The threshold of the regime    switch is increased, on the other hand, 
because the primary surplus is lowered. These interacting, the net impact is as stated in the following 
proposition:  
1 + t R 1 ˆ + t ε
17 
  
Proposition 3: Consider reduction in  . Then    1 + t n
(i)   decreases  if 
*
1 + t R 0 / 1 1 ∂ ∂ + + t t R < ε  
(ii)   is  enhanced  if   is  increasing 
*
1 ˆ + t ε
*
1 + t R
*
1 + t R
*
1 ˆ + t ε
 
In general, the equilibrium effects of the demographic change on  and   are ambiguous. In 
section 5, we conduct a simulation to compare the scenarios of different demographic changes. 
 
4.4 Debt accumulation   
 
In the previous section,    was taken as fixed and the equilibrium was established as 
conditional upon it. We now consider accumulation of public debt. It is stochastic as it relies on 
realization of the productivity shock. Combining (8’) and (13) and advancing the period by one, we 
obtain the transition process of the debt-to-capital ratio as follows: 
1 1/ + + t t k b
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~ where  + t ε   addresses that its value is uncertain at period t.   
 
The immediately higher   is transited to a higher   in the next period given   
accounting for the dependency of   on b . According to Proposition 2, this implies that 
the risk of fiscal consolidation at period t + 1 is raised with the current debt-to-capital ratio if 
. 
1 1/ + + t t k b 2 2 / + + t t k b 1 + t ε
*
1 + t R 1 1/ + + t t k
0 ) / ( / 1 1 1 ≥ ∂ ∂ + + + t t t k b R
1 + t n
1 1 / + + t t k
) , / , ( ˆ *
1 1 1 n k b Rt t t t + + + =ε ε 1 + t ε
0
1 1 ) / ( / k b k b t t = + +
1




Figure 4 depicts the shape of the transition function (17) with constant    at n. It shows three 
levels of  : low, middle, and high. Note that a smaller value of    shifts (17) upward. Also note 
that the curve approaches infinity if b   goes to the critical level such that
; that is,  becomes coincident with the threshold of fiscal consolidation. 
Suppose that  . By (17), the debt-to-capital ratio carried over to the next period is 
given by b , being located at point E if  . In the figure, we have 
t ε 1 + t ε




t ε ε = +1




L k b ε ε < < +
1
1 / , ˆ
0 2 = + t b
, which implies that there arises a regime change at period t+1 if  , 
whereas government financing is sustainable when . Figure 4 shows that  
approaches infinity at  without consolidation. In the event  , no public debt, that is, 
, is issued under the consolidation rule, and thus, the economy moves back to its origin. On 
t ε +
L
t ε ε = +1
L ε t ε + = 1
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 the other hand, the ratio is lowered to    or point F when .  
2
2 2 ) / ( / k b k b t t = + +
H
t ε ε = +1
 
Figure 4 
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5.  Simulation 
 
5.1 Specification   
 
This section aims to conduct a simulation of the comparative statics developed in section 3. To be 
specific, we examine the theoretical hypotheses that public debt accumulation may lead to lower 
interest rates and that the equilibrium interest rate may exhibit a discrete change from relatively low 
to an extreme high level. In addition, we confirm whether the equilibrium in the pre-consolidation 
regime is affected by fiscal consolidation rule and demographic change. Moreover, we calculate the 
threshold at which consolidation occurs given  at period t. Needless to say, our quantitative 
analysis does not intend to replicate any practice of economy. Rather, it is to supplement our 
theoretical model, resolving ambiguity of its results and clarifying its policy implications.   
t t k b /
 
The parameters are specified in Table 1.   distributes over [0.5 1.5] according to the inverse 
U-shaped density function with mean of one. We set the tax rate at a relatively low 10%. We set the 
expenditure rate at 10% of potential output as well. This implies that primary deficit is likely to 
result unless  is larger than mean of one, so there exists the possibility that public debt is 




 expenditure to be cut in half to  . The wage tax rate under consolidation is increasing in 
, whereas it increases with   as imposed by Assumption 2. This is specified in Table 1. 
Consolidation relies on more tax increases for large debt to capital ratio, whereas the default rate is 
raised when 
05 . 0 1 = + t λ
1 + t ε 1 1/ + + t t k b
1 + t ε  is small and the economy is therefore depressed. Such presumption should be 
plausible.  
 
The parameter g in the tax function refers to the extent of the required tax increase. The simulation 
set three values of g (0.5, 0.75, and 1.0). Higher g implies a larger tax increase in the consolidation, 
which in turn implies a lower default rate  that is defined as residual by (15): the tax function 
above is constrained so that    takes interior value. By comparing results of different levels of g, 
we can assess the effect of fiscal rule on  and    as well as the transition of the debt-to-capital 
ratio. To examine the demographic change, we consider the case that the population remains 
constant over time and also the case that it is declining. In the latter, we assume that it annually 
decreases by 0.3%. Taking one period to stand for 30 years, we let  . Distinct by 
the parameter g and the demography, four scenarios are presented as summarized in Table 2. 
Scenario 1 is taken as a benchmark in the following table. 
1 + t ξ
1 +
1 + t ξ
*
1 ˆ + t ε
t t n n
30




Table 1: Parameters 
δ  0.5 
α  0.3 
θ  1.333 
Ａ  7.0 
} ,ζ λ Ω , {
0 τ ≡   τ = 0.1 λ = 0.1 
 

















g Min ε τ τ ε τ
1 . 0 (
+ + 1 1 1 ) / , t t k b
) / , 1 1 1
+ t
 
  + + + t t k b t ε λ =
 
Table 2: Scenarios 
Scenario 1 (Benchmark)  g = 0.75     
  1 1 = + t n  
 
Scenario 2  g = 0.5 
Scenario 3  g = 1.0 
Scenario 4  g = 0.75   
30





In simulation, we focus only on the interior equilibrium. The GB interest rates for different scenarios 
20 
 are shown in Figure 5, where   is treated parametrically taken on horizontal axis. In all 
scenarios, there exists a range in which    exhibits downward sloping, confirming our theoretical 
hypothesis. Take the benchmark scenario (Scenario 1). The interest rate is initially declining, with 
. Its moderate downward trend continues until  =0.78, where   takes the 
minimum value. The slope is then reversed, further increasing the debt-to-capital ratio and rapidly 
raising the interest rate. At  =1.11, the stable interior level of   disappears, diverging to 
the corner equilibrium (which is not explicitly treated here). This is consistent with the illustration of 
Figure 4.   
1 1/ + + t t k b
1 / + t k
*
1 + t R
1 1 / + + t t k b 1 1/ + + t t k b
*
1 + t R
1 + t b
*
1 + t R
1 1/ + + t t k b 1 1/ + + t t k b
1 = + t
 
The benchmark scenario is compared with Scenario 2 and 3 to assess impacts of the tax increase. 
 in Scenario 2 barely differs from the benchmark for low levels of  . After    = 
0.3, however, the former begins to exceed the latter, and the difference between them widens quickly. 
Once the ratio goes beyond 0.735, Scenario 2 loses its interior equilibrium, whereas it remains in the 
benchmark scenario. In the former, with g = 0.5, the tax increase is less significant than the latter 
when fiscal consolidation is implemented. Given that both scenarios impose 
*
1 + t R
05 . 0 λ   in the 
event of the consolidation, this implies that Scenario 2 experiences a higher default rate and 
consequently adds a risk premium to GB. Now consider Scenario 3, with g = 1. Again, its interest 
rate moves about the same as the benchmark when the public debt-to-capital ratio is not high. For 
>0.5, the disparity turns out to be prominent, with    in Scenario 3 staying lower than in 
the benchmark. The former can then sustain the interior equilibrium for larger   than the 
latter. It can then be concluded that consolidation involving more tax increases leads to lower  , 
sustaining the interior equilibrium.
1 + t k
*
1 + t R
1
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Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenario4
 
 
12  The simulation also reveals that an unstable equilibrium appears when the debt-to-capital ratio is very close to the 
critical level of the public debt-to-capital ratio in which the stable interior solution disappears.    
21 
  
Consider the threshold of regime change,  . In all scenarios, it is monotonically increasing in 
 as in Figure 6. In comparing different scenarios with different consolidation rules,   
stays lower when the tax increase is larger; that is, g is high, reflecting a lower interest rate. The 
prospect of large tax increases in the event of fiscal restructuring that contributes to a lower default 
rate serves to mitigate the consolidation risk, which should be intuitive. The risk is reflected in a GB 
premium that is defined as the difference between GB interest rate and expected return on capital. 
The premium remains negligible when risk is low: according to the consolidation risk, the revenue 
deficiency is largely filled by tax increases and expenditure cut. The default rate in the event of 
consolidation is raised as the debt-to-capital ratio increases, which in turn augments the premium.   
*
1 ˆ + t ε
1 1/ + + t t k b
*
1 ˆ + t ε
1 1/ + + t t k b
, ˆ ( 1 1 + + t t Z R
 


























































































































































Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenario4
 
 
To see the effect of the demography, we compare the benchmark scenario with Scenario 4. The 
figure reveals that overall the declining population serves to diminish equilibrium interest rates. The 
gap of interest rates between the two scenarios first declines with   until the ratio reaches 
0.72, and then starts to increase sharply. In Scenario 4, interior equilibrium is sustained up to 
  = 1.67, and thus the fiscal consolidation risk is reduced relative to the benchmark case. 
Recall that in general, the demographic impact on    was ambiguous. The simulation establishes 
that the threshold is lowered in the case of smaller population. That is, the downward shift of 
1 1 / + + t t k b
*
1 ˆ + t ε
) 1 + t  due to decreasing n dominates the upward movement of  1 + t ˆ 1 + t ) , ( 1 1 + + t t Z R ε ε , with 
primary balance deteriorating as in Figure 2. 
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Growth decreases as private capital is crowded out by public debt, which decreases   given 
(8’). Figure 6 gives the expected growth rate from the period t + 1 perspective. Tax increases (i.e., 
higher g) in the consolidation regime exert two opposing impacts on growth. As stated above, it 
serves to lower  , which increases   as accumulated at period t. The tax burden, on the 
other hand, reduces the output in the event of consolidation at period t+1 that is reflected in the 
bracket of the expectation in (9’). In comparison between Scenarios 1 and 2, the two yield almost the 
same growth rate for lower  , and the latter experiences slightly higher growth after   
= 0.4 than the former until the critical ratio in which the interior solution disappears in Scenario 2. 
The same can be seen when Scenario 3 is compared with Scenario 1. However, the difference is 
negligible.  
t t k k / 1 +
+ t b
*
1 + t R t t k k / 1 +
1 1/ + + t t k b 1 1/ + t k
 
Demography makes a considerable difference. The expected growth rate seen in Scenario 4 is 
initially lower than the benchmark scenario, but as the debt-to-capital ratio increases, the relationship 
is reversed and the difference expands as public debt is built up relative to capital. This may be 
counter-intuitive, but it is because the lower risk of fiscal consolidation serves to decrease the 
expected tax rate from the period t perspective. In addition, with GB interest rate being lowered, 
private capital accumulation is less crowded in Scenario 4, enhancing  .  t t k k / 1 +
 















































































































































Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 Scenario4
 
 
5.3 Debt accumulation 
 
23 
 Consider the dynamics of the public debt-to-capital ratio, which has been treated as exogenous in the 
previous subsection. In doing so, we divide  , which is realized at t + 1 period into four classes 
and for each quartered group, and the (conditional) expected level of    is calculated given a 
that is determined at period t. Note that the expectation is taken from the period t 
perspective. Table 2 shows the results in the benchmark scenario.   
1 + t ε
2 2 / + + t t k b
1 1/ + + t t k b
1 1/ + + t t k b
1 + t
 
Table 2: Transition of Debt-to-capital Ratio 
 
0.5~0.75 0.75~ 1.00~1.25 1.25~1.50
0.03 0.85 0. 0.10 0.02
0.06 1.10 0. 0.14 0.04
0.12 0. 0.22 0.10
0.18 0. 0.32 0.16
0.21 0. 0.37 0.19






















1 1 / + + t t k b
1 + t ε
 
The expected ratio of    is increasing with    and is higher for the lower quarter of  2 2 / + + t t k b
ε . At the lowest quarter, that is,  , the average of    goes beyond the critical 
ratio,  =1.1, at which interior equilibrium ceases to exist according to Figure 2, when the 
debt-to-capital ratio   is more than 0.06, implying that fiscal consolidation is inevitable at 
t+2 or 
] 75 . 0 , 5 . 0 [ 1∈ + t ε 2 2 / + + t t k b
+ t b 2 2 / + t k
1 1/ + + t t k b
ε = +2 t ε ˆ 1 + t ε
1 1 / + + t t k b ] 5 . 1 , 25 . 1 [ 1 ∈ + t
. In higher-quartered groups of  , the expected ratio remains at sustainable level 
for larger  . For instance, at the highest quarter, that is, ε , interior 
equilibrium survives at period t+1 for   less  than  0.72.   1 1/ + + t t k b
 
 
6.  Political Economy 
 
We have so far assumed the process of accumulation of public debt as exogenous. One possible 
objection is that there should exist a self-correcting mechanism to contain public debt at sustainable 
levels by raising taxes and/or cutting expenditures. Indeed, rational voters may not allow the risk of 
fiscal crisis to deepen over time, but may undertake preventive measures to curtail such risk. In our 
OLG setting, however, the representative household of each generation with limited life span may 
24 
 not act in such a manner. To see this in effect, consider simple majority voting over tax increases in 
the pre-consolidation regime so as to decrease public deficit. Both the young and the old generations 
at each period exercise their voting right.   
 
What are voters’ preferences for such preventive measures? The consumption of the old voters under 
the status quo is equal to 
    (4.2’)   ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + + + − − − + − = t t t t t t
o
t r q R q s c ξ  
where the bar implies that their choices are sunk at the beginning of period t. Given that the return on 
private capital declines with wage tax, the older group opposes any tax increase. 
 
Now consider the young voters. Their lifetime expected utility in the equilibrium realization of   
is expressed by   
t ε
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The first term represents the direct effect of raising  . It lowers  Ψ , the after-tax wage income that 
the young generation earns at period t, which decreases utility. The enhanced tax revenue, on the 





































The above in turn enhances expected return on capital. This captured in the second term of (20) 
serves to raise the young’s lifetime utility.   
 
Therefore, the combined effect of such tax increases is not certain. To resolve this ambiguity, we rely 
on simulation. In Figure 8, we take the benchmark scenario and depict changes in the logarithm of 
the expected utility as wage tax rate increases from the initial level  τ =10%. The different log   
corresponds to different levels of   that are pre determined at period t.   takes a smaller 
value as the ratio increases, reflecting the crowding effect that in turn lowers receiving wages. For all 
, utility is decreasing with the tax rate. This reveals that the perverse effect of decreasing 
disposable wage income due to higher tax rates dominates the gain from augmenting the expected 
t EU
1 / + t b
t b / t k t t k b /
1 + t k
25 
 return on capital with the consolidation risk being reduced. Interestingly, the utility loss derived from 
increasing wage tax is exacerbated, with public debt-to-capital ratio being raised as a result. Thus, it 
increasingly becomes difficult to raise taxes as government finances worsen. We obtain mostly the 
same results for all other scenarios. In short, the young household will vote against tax increases in 
the pre-consolidation regime.   
 
Thus, preventive measures of the fiscal consolidation risk will never gain political support from 
existing generations. The public debt will be then left to accumulate until the regime switch becomes 
inevitable when  . To state it differently, the normative criteria of fiscal sustainability, such 
as the Dormer condition and the transversality condition of the long-term government budget, do not 
incentivize contemporary politics to undertake fiscal restructuring. Of course, the future generation 
will suffer from large public debt that lowers    (due to crowding out) and reduces their wages, 
and that can trigger wage tax increases in the event of the consolidation. Such welfare loss of the 
future generation is not incorporated by current voters, who are assumed to be selfish.   
*
1 1 + + ≤ t t ε ε
1 + t k
 







0. 0.130 0.135 0.140 0.145
Expected utility 
100 0.105 0.110 0.115 0.120 0.125
Wage tax rate
b/k=0.15 b/k=0.3 b/k=0.45 b/k=0.6 b/k=0.75 b/k=0.9
 
  
The political failure to undertake a restructuring effort has been examined in Alesia and Drazen 
(1991), which modeled delayed stabilization as a “war of attrition” or a sort of game of chicken 
between vested interests. They address the fact that the timing of actual fiscal consolidation turns out 
to be too late relative to the optimal timing that maximizes joint payoff of stakeholders. Related 
studies by Velasco (2000) and Ihori and Itaya (2002) consider public debt accumulation as a 
consequence of a non-cooperative subgame among special interest groups that freely extract 
resources from the government budget. In their context, fiscal restructuring is featured as a voluntary 
contribution for the public good that suffers from the free riding motive. These models assume 
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 infinite life of agents without cooperation. The present paper with its OLG setting addresses the 
motive of contemporary generations to shift the burden of fiscal consolidation to the future (unborn) 
generations that cannot yet vote.   
 
The present model does not account for the political process of determining tax and expenditure 
rates, or τ and λ in the pre-consolidation regime. Rather, these values are taken as exogenous. 
However, we have established the conditions under which the initial tax and expenditure policies are 
not corrected and the consolidation risk is enhanced as the current generations do not agree to accept 
a tax hike.   
 
 
7.  Concluding remark   
 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between GB interest rates and the fiscal consolidation rule 
using an overlapping generation model with endogenous and stochastic growth settings. Our key 
findings are summarized as follows. GB interest rates may decline as public debt accumulates 
relative to private capital, as opposed to the conventional view that buildup of public debt 
accompanies a rise of interest rates. This is consistent with the seemingly paradoxical circumstances 
of GB interest rates in Japan, where rates remain low despite a public debt ratio to GDP that has 
been increasing for the last several decades. This paper also addresses the fact that fiscal 
consolidation rule plays a key role in determining equilibrium interest rates. Moreover, the relatively 
stable interior equilibrium may disappear in a discrete manner that shifts the economy to a situation 
in which consolidation is inevitable and GB interest is quite high. The normative standpoint suggests 
that preventive action should be undertaken to contain such fiscal risk. However, precautionary tax 
increases to contain public debt to sustainable levels will not gain the political support of existing 
generations, whose life span is limited. Instead, voters prefer to shift the ultimate burden of public 
debt to future generations that cannot currently vote.   
 
Admittedly, our model is highly stylized and abstracts some key issues that should be further 
examined in future research. These include (1) the search for the “real” threshold of regime change 
 and the limitation of public debt-to-GDP ratio, undertaken by calibrating our model to real 
economies (e.g., the Japanese economy), (2) the effect on our model of inflation based on the Fiscal 
Theory of Price Level as illustrated by Cochrane (2010), and (3) analysis of another voting game 
(e.g., between low and high income households) over tax increases in the pre-consolidation regime 
so as to decrease public deficit. Our study would be more worthwhile if it were possible to show 
those results more generally. 
*
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By lemma 1, the RHS takes a finite value, whereas the left side diverges as the public debt-to-capital 
ratio rises, or   goes  to  infinity.    
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